The Philippines (Orphan Military)

The Twenty-First Century Armed Forces of the Philippines: Orphan of Counter-Insurgency or Military Geared for the Long War of the Century?

What have the consequences been of the Philippine military's longstanding focus on low-intensity conflict (LIC)? The Armed Forces of the Philippines' (AFP) continuous campaign against communist and secessionist insurgents (together with its inability to modernise and the post-1992 disruption in US military assistance) have adversely affected its structure and combat efficiency. Its focus on LIC has made it one of the most poorly equipped armed forces in Southeast Asia, yet has also enabled it to gain experience that is valuable for contemporary counter-insurgency operations. The AFP could in fact be the Southeast Asian military force that is best prepared for twenty-first century warfare.

For four decades, the AFP has focused on LIC against communist and secessionist insurgents. These ‘wars of the third kind’ involve a sub-state entity attempting to bring about political change by fighting more effectively and ruthlessly than its stronger adversary – usually a state actor. Post-9/11, this type of guerilla warfare is increasing around the world, and a global shift in emphasis is underway from conventional military campaigns to small-scale counter-insurgency operations.

The AFP’s intense focus on internal security has reduced its overall military capabilities and undermined its capacity to address external threats. Attention and resources have been diverted from external defence-related modernisation projects. In particular, the Philippine military’s combat capabilities have been adversely affected by: (1) the withdrawal of American bases from the country in 1992 and the consequent termination of US military assistance; (2) the failure of the AFP’s 1990 modernisation program due to the Philippine Congress’s reluctance to provide finance; and (3) the resurgence of communist and secessionist movements in the late 1990s.

Major US-supported reform is currently underway in the Philippine defence establishment, however. This aims to change the AFP’s politico-organisational context and transform it from a military geared to internal security to one capable of external defence. The reform programme’s success depends on three factors:

• The AFP’s ability to neutralise the armed component of the communist insurgency, so that it can focus resources on developing conventional defence capabilities.
• The Philippine defence community’s capacity to generate domestic and international support and assistance for reform.
• A dramatic increase in annual funding, and greater autonomy to formulate a strategy-driven multi-year budgeting process.

Given the challenges of successful reform, the AFP is unlikely to be able to develop the structure and acquire the equipment necessary to catch up with Southeast Asia’s modern conventional armed forces. However, 'modern' equipment and capabilities are not necessarily needed for effective counterinsurgency operations; the AFP may in fact be the most experienced and appropriately equipped force in the region to respond to contemporary security challenges.

• Post-9/11, major security challenges do not come from state actors but from non-state entities like criminal groups, terrorist networks, and insurgent movements. Southeast Asia must deal with transnational terrorist cells, mass-based insurgent groups, and religious paramilitary groups.
• Most Southeast Asian states have modern and well-equipped military establishments, yet struggle to keep up with these diverse, amorphous, and systemic security challenges.
• The AFP has gained valuable experience in these low-technology, counter-terrorist/insurgency campaigns that rely on small arms, tactical aircraft and armour, good intelligence work, and infinite patience.

 

Author: Renato Cruz De Castro
Source: De Castro, R. C., 2010, 'The Twenty-First Century Armed Forces of the Philippines: Orphan of Counter-Insurgency or Military Geared for the Long War of the Century?', Contemporary Politics, vol. 16, no. 2, pp.153-171
Size: 20 pages